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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of temperature on economic growth on a
panel of 156 countries over a 50-year time period. We use random fluctu-
ations in a country’s annual average temperature over time as our strategy
for identifying the causal effect of temperature on GDP per capita growth.
Previous work has found that temperature has a statistically significant re-
lationship with growth when fitting data from all countries with a nonlinear
model. We hypothesize that countries with different observable characteris-
tics have differing responses to changes in temperature and we use recursive
model partitioning to find data-driven splits in the dataset. We run the
model on a number of country-level characteristics and we find that GDP
per capita percentile and historical mean temperature are the variables that
best fit the data. We divide the countries into four groups: low income - low
temperature (20 countries), low income - high temperature (70 countries),
high income - low temperature (36 countries), high income - high temperature
(33 countries). We obtain different coefficients for the relationship between
temperature and growth for each group. We also use agricultural GDP per
capita growth as a dependent variable and obtain coefficients for the rela-
tionship between temperature and agricultural GDP per capita growth. We
compare our results with results obtained from a model that does not have
any splits (Burke et al., 2015). We find that dividing countries into groups
using a data-driven method has a significant impact on future projections
of GDP per capita growth under different climate change scenarios and how
we interpret the effects that changes in average temperatures might have on
countries. A model that does not split countries into groups overestimates
the gains that low temperature countries might make from rising tempera-
tures and underestimates the ability of high income - high temperature coun-
tries to capitalize on the high temperatures that they regularly experience.
Our model takes into account adaptations to historical temperatures that
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countries may have and we find that low temperature countries have lower
“optimum temperatures” that help them achieve maximum growth and like-
wise, high temperature countries have higher “optimum temperatures.” We
predict that low income - low temperature countries and high income - low
temperature countries are likely to face low growth (1.73 % and 0.00879 %
respectively) in the year 2100; low income - high temperature countries will
face negative growth (-3.19 %) and high income - high temperature countries
will face positive growth (3.16 %).
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Climate is “the joint probability distribution over several weather parame-
ters, such as temperature or wind speed, that can be expected to occur at
a given location during a specific interval of time” (Carleton and Hsiang,
2016). The scientific community’s consensus is that “differences in vulner-
ability and exposure arise from non-climactic factors and from multidimen-
sional inequalities often produced by uneven development processes” (IPCC,
2014b). Adding to our understanding of how the economy is likely to change
as a response to projected changes in climate remains an important research
objective. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have
stated that “human influence on climate is clear, and recent anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate
changes have had widespread impact on human and natural systems” (IPCC,
2014b). In our paper, we add to the body of work that explores how climate
affects human actions (i.e. the economy) and in turn, how that might change
the human actions that affect the climate. In this paper, we employ some of
the “machine learning” techniques that have arisen in recent years to help
us in our understanding of the complex relationship between climate and the
economy (Athey and Imbens, 2015; Zeileis et al., 2008).
Dell et al. (2012) use historical fluctuations in temperature as a strategy
for identifying the causal impact of temperature on economic growth. Dell
et al. (2012) find that there are “large and negative impacts of higher temper-
atures on growth, but only in poor countries” and for high income countries,
“changes in temperature do not have a robust discernable effect on growth.”
We find that both high and low income countries face negative impacts of
higher temperatures, depending on the mean temperatures they experience
historically. Dell et al. (2012) note that their analysis only accounts for short-
run economic impacts of temperature in the economy and that countries may
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adapt to a particular temperature in the long run. Our paper seeks to test
for the presence of this adaptation to historical climate.
Burke et al. (2015) use historical fluctuations in temperature as their iden-
tification strategy and account for nonlinearity in the relationship between
temperature and growth. Burke et al. (2015) find that productivity peaks
“at an annual average temperature of 13 ◦C and [declines] strongly at higher
temperatures.” Burke et al. (2015) obtain their results by fitting data from
all countries in their dataset using one model. We hypothesize that countries
with different observable characteristics respond differently to temperature
fluctuations and explore this heterogeneity with a data-driven algorithm. In
particular, we use a number of “partitioning variables” (GDP per capita
percentile, Historical mean temperature, agricultural share of GDP, etc.)
and find a value within each variable that optimally divides the data into
subgroups. For instance, with mean temperature, we arrange the dataset
according to the partitioning variable from the lowest value (−3.97 ◦C) to
the highest value (28.37 ◦C) and run regressions for subgroups of the data at
0.5 ◦C intervals. For each value of the partitioning variable c , the dataset
is split into two subgroups: observations < c and observations ≥ c. We run
a regression that fits our model to each subgroup and calculate the residual
sum of squares (RSS) for each regression. The “optimal” value of c is the
one where the total RSS for both regressions is minimized. We then com-
pare optimal values across partitioning variables to determine which variable
is best suited for splitting the data into subgroups, again finding the value
of c across variables that corresponds to the lowest total RSS. (Table 3.2 - 3.4)
The first optimal split occurs at the 54th percentile for GDP per capita.
We divide the dataset into two groups: High Income (GDP Percentile ≥
54) and Low Income (GDP Percentile < 54). We then run the test on High
Income and Low Income groups separately, imposing a minimum node size
constraint where we ensure that there are at least 10 countries in each group.
For the High Income group, the second optimal split occurs where historical
mean temperature is 13 ◦C and for the Low Income group the second opti-
mal split occurs where the historical mean temperature is 17 ◦C. Hence, the
whole dataset is divided into four groups in total: low income - low temper-
ature, low income - high temperature, high income - low temperature and
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high income - high temperature. We provide descriptive statistics for the
subgroups in Table 3.5.
Under Burke et al. (2015)’s model, temperature has a statistically signifi-
cant impact on economic growth for all countries. In our paper, we find
that the statistical significance of the relationship between temperature and
growth is largely driven by high income countries (Table 4.1) and in partic-
ular, high income - low temperature countries. We find that the predictions
for average global GDP growth do not change much when you account for
splitting the data but the average GDP growth in each subgroup does vary
significantly (Table 4.2; Table 4.3).
We generate predictions for GDP per capita growth using our model un-
der four different climate scenarios: baseline temperatures (1960 - 2010),
global average temperature increase of 1 ◦C, global average temperature in-
crease of 2 ◦C and RCP 8.5 temperature projections for the year 2100 (Riahi
et al., 2011). We compare our predictions for GDP per capita growth for
each scenario against the global average generated by Burke et al. (2015)’s
model (BHM) (Table 4.2; Table 4.3). We also compare predictions for each
group generated under BHM and under our model (Het) (Table 4.4; Table
4.5).
In general, our results support the view that there is long-run adaptation
to climate at the country-level. If there is no adaptation to mean temper-
atures over time and we assume that there is a “hill-shaped relationship”
(Mendelsohn and Dinar, 1999) between temperature and economic growth,
we will see that high temperature countries will face high damages when
mean temperatures increase, because they are on the negatively sloped side
of the ‘hill.’ Low temperature countries will have increased growth as they
approach the optimal temperature for growth and growth will decline if mean
temperatures increase beyond the optimal temperature for growth. If there
is adaptation to mean temperatures over time, we expect that low temper-
ature countries will have a lower optimal temperature for growth and high
temperature countries will have a higher optimal temperature for growth.
With adaptation, low temperature countries may face damages as a result of
increased mean temperatures because they are beyond the low temperature
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optimum, even if they are moving towards the ‘global optimum’ temperature
for growth. Similarly, high temperature countries may not have damages as
high as we would predict because they might be moving towards the high tem-
perature optimum, even as they are moving away from the ‘global optimum’
temperature for growth. BHM generates a global optimum temperature for
growth of 13 ◦C, and our results show that there is a lower optimal temper-
ature at 9 ◦C and a higher optimal temperature at 17 ◦C (Figures 4.4 - 4.5).
We use a detailed comparison of predicted values generated under BHM’s
model and our model to show that our view of the magnitude and severity
of climate change damages will differ depending on whether or not there is
adaptation to climate in the long run (Tables 4.5 - 4.6).
For the RCP 8.5 scenario, BHM predicts that low income - low tempera-
ture countries will have relatively high growth (4.83 %) whereas our model
predicts that they will have low growth (1.73 %). For low income - high tem-
perature countries, both models predict that they will have negative growth
in the year 2100, though our model (-3.19 %) predicts slightly larger dam-
ages than BHM (-2.79 %). For the high income - low temperature countries,
BHM predicts high growth (2.02 %) whereas our model predicts low growth
(0.00879 %). For high income - high temperature countries, BHM predicts
negative growth (-0.0988 %) whereas our model predicts high growth (3.16
%). Finally, we also generate predictions comparing total GDP per capita
growth and agricultural GDP per capita growth between the different groups
(Table 4.8; Table 4.9) and we discuss those results in more detail in Chapter 4.
Our findings suggest that because countries respond differently to changes
in temperature, it may be very difficult to come to a global consensus on
climate change. However, our findings also suggest that, if climate change is
not mitigated, temperature change will lead to substantial damages in both





The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines “climate change”
as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. by using
statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its proper-
ties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.”
(IPCC, 2014b) Figure 2.1 below shows us that average surface tempera-
ture has been increasing since 1850 and that there is “robust multi-decadal
warming.”(IPCC, 2013) Though discussion on the interaction between cli-
Figure 2.1
Global Average Surface Temperature 1850 – 2012,
Figure SPM1a, (IPCC, 2013).
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mate and the economy have gained much ardor and traction in recent years,
thinkers throughout history have grappled with the impact of climate on
human activities. In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldǔn outlines his theory of
how climate affects human civilization. Ibn Khaldǔn describes how people
living in “temperate” regions experience “temperate” conditions and this is
reflected in “their dwellings, clothings, foodstuffs and crafts,” whereas those
who were exposed to more extreme temperatures near the equator or near
the poles tended to have less “developed” economies. Climate also affects
human capital: “The physique and character of its inhabitants are temperate
to the (high) degree necessitated by the composition of the air [climate] in
which they live.” (Khaldǔn, 1958) In 1748, Montesquieu wrote in his The
Spirit of Law regarding how men changed their behavior when exposed to
a hotter climate: “If we reflect on the late wars, [...] we shall find that the
northern people, transplanted into southern regions, did not perform such
exploits as their countrymen who, fighting in their own climate, possessed
their full vigor and courage.” Eventually excessive heat “[deprives] the body
of all vigor and strength [and] then faintness is communicated to the mind
[...]”(Montesquieu, 1750)
Carleton and Hsiang (2016) outline a general mechanism by which climate
affects human activities: (1) Weather events are drawn from the probability
distribution that determines the climate. (2) Each weather event generates
an effect on a population and these events produce “responses” among the
population. (3) Direct effects of weather events combine with nonclimactic
factors to produce a distribution of observed data such as GDP. (4) People
may alter their behavior in anticipation of weather events based on the in-
formation they are able to access. IPCC (2012) reports that “a changing
climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, dura-
tion, and timing of extreme weather and climate events, and can result in
unprecedented extreme weather and climate events.” IPCC (2012) highlight
three ways in which climate change might occur: (1) Through a shift in mean
weather conditions but leaving the shape of the probability distribution in-
tact (2) through an increase in variability (fatter tails, more extreme events)
without a shift in the mean or (3) through a change in the shape of the prob-
ability distribution, such as being more skewed towards hotter temperatures.
A shift in the climate probability distribution leads to changes in both the
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distribution of weather events and the distribution of social responses. A di-
rect effect occurs as a result of a weather event (e.g. higher daily maximum
temperatures), but people may also change their behavior (e.g. lowering the
temperature on their thermostats), resulting in a shift in the distribution of
observable outcomes that is a result of “a combination and interaction of
these two effects.” (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016)
2.2 The Impact of Climate on Socioeconomic Variables
A number of empirical studies show the effect that climate variables have on
socioeconomic factors (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016). The human body regu-
lates its temperatures so that bodily functions can continue to operate with-
out any detrimental effects to health. Extreme temperatures affect increase
stress on thermoregulatory systems and increase the risk of mortality (Huy-
nen et al., 2001). It is thought that heat waves “displace mortality”, whereby
mortality rises during heat waves but falls in subsequent weeks, “principally
[affecting] those whose health is already compromised and would have died in
the short term anyway.”(Huynen et al., 2001) The effects of colder tempera-
tures seem to last longer and it is not known if there is a similar “mortality
displacement” effect with cold spells (Guo et al., 2014). Guo et al. (2014)
look at daily temperature and mortality rate data in 12 countries and find
a relationship between ambient temperature and mortality. The 75th per-
centile of daily temperatures is associated with the lowest mortality rates
while temperatures at the higher or lower extremes of the distribution are
associated with higher risk of mortality (Guo et al., 2014). IPCC (2014b)
Working Group I reports that “it is very likely that the number and intensity
of hot days have increased markedly in the last three decades and virtually
certain that this increase will continue into the late 21st century.”(Olsson
et al., 2014)
Climate has also been found to have an impact on civil conflict. Hsiang et al.
(2011) find that the probability of new conflicts arising in tropical regions is
double during El Niño years compared to La Niña years. Hsiang et al. (2011)
challenge “the notion that random local temperature or rainfall shocks are
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analogues for global climate changes” because the global climate may inter-
act with larger scale forces like conflict in ways that are not captured by daily
average temperatures; global climate may also affect geopolitical factors on
a larger scale than the areas captured by daily average temperatures, which
may differ in different regions of a country; changes in climate are subject to
less variability than changes in local weather, and the two may generate dif-
ferent social responses. Hsiang et al. (2011) find that the annual conflict risk
of low-income countries is the most strongly correlated to the incidence of
El Niño weather patterns. However, it is not known if low-income countries
are more susceptible to climate-induced conflict because they are less able
to buffer against environmental shocks or if countries have a lower income
because they have historically been more sensitive to changes in climate or if
there is an unobserved reason for the relationship between climate and con-
flict in low-income countries. Furthermore, Hsiang and Burke (2014) look at
50 quantitative studies on the relationship between climate and conflict and
find that “the majority of studies suggest that conflict increases and social
stability decreases when temperatures are hot and precipitation is extreme,
but in situations where average temperature is already temperate, anoma-
lously low temperatures may also undermine [social] stability.” Hsiang and
Burke (2014) also find that the relationship between climate and conflict
holds for a range of temporal and spatial scales.
2.3 Climate and the Economy
In the climate-economy literature, there is a question regarding the distribu-
tional effects of changes in global climate.In 1992, Thomas Schelling writes
in the American Economic Review that “[today] very little of our gross do-
mestic product is produced outdoors, susceptible to climate. Agriculture and
forestry account for less than 3 percent of GDP, and little else is affected. [...]
Considering that in most developed countries [...] agricultural productivity
for most parts of the world continues to improve, and that many crops and
cultivated plants will benefit directly from enhanced photosynthesis due to
increased carbon dioxide, one cannot be certain that the net impact on agri-
cultural productivity will be negative or, if negative, noticed in the developed
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world.” (Schelling, 1992) Schelling (1992) observes that there is a “mismatch”
between the low-income countries that will be disproportionately affected by
climate change and the high-income countries who are able to afford climate
change mitigation. He notes that even if high-income countries were willing
to invest heavily in greenhouse gas abatement technology, “it would be hard
to make the case that the countries we now perceive as vulnerable would be
better off 50 or 75 years from now if 10 or 20 trillions of dollars had been
invested in carbon abatement rather than in their economic development.”
Mendelsohn et al. (2000) find that climate-dependent sectors of the econ-
omy tend to have a hill-shaped relationship with temperature (Figure 2.2).
This is corroborated with Burke et al. (2015)’s fitting of a non-linear rela-
tionship between temperature and GDP per capita growth (Figure 2.3).
The implication of a hill-shaped relationship between temperature and out-
put or income is that “countries that happen to be in relatively cool regions
of the world will likely benefit from warming and that countries that happen
to be in relatively warm regions of the world will be harmed by warming.” In
fact, Burke et al. (2015) find optimal average annual temperature for GDP
per capita to be 13 ◦C, which means that countries with an average annual
temperature below 13 ◦C are likely to benefit from increasing average temper-
atures and countries with average annual temperature above 13 ◦C will have
“damages” (reduced GDP per capita) from increasing average temperatures.
However, we should note that changes in average temperatures, while a good
index of the extent or severity of climate change impacts, do not reflect the
heterogeneity of climate change impacts – “the results may be warmer in
some places and colder in others, wetter in some places and drier in others,
cloudier in some places and sunnier in others, stormier in some places and
less stormy in others, – generally a complex of changes that would bear no
easy relation to an average change in global temperature.” (Schelling, 1992)
In the case of Mendelsohn et al. (2000), however, in estimating a climate
response function for each country, they assume that climate change impacts
each country in the same way, and only country characteristics differ. The
authors generate country-specific response functions for five sectors likely to
be affected by climate: agriculture, water, energy, timber and coasts, and
9
Figure 2.2
Hill-shaped Relationship Between Temperature
and Climate-Dependent Economic Sectors,
Figure 1, (Mendelsohn et al., 2000).
Figure 2.3
Non-linear Relationship Between Annual Average
Temperature and ln(GDP per capita),
Figure 2a, (Burke et al., 2015).
sum sectoral impacts to obtain an aggregate impact for each country. They
report that “the poorest half of the world’s nations suffer the bulk of the
damages from climate change, whereas the wealthiest quarter has almost no
net impacts.” Mendelsohn et al. (2000) find that the coefficients for the re-
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lationship between temperature and GDP are “slightly different” between
high and low-income countries. They report that “the developed country
response function is both higher and flatter than the developing country re-
sponse function, presumably because the high technology farmers have more
capital and can substitute capital for climate. The model predicts that agri-
culture in developing countries is more vulnerable to higher than optimal
temperatures.”
Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) look at the relationship between daily tem-
perature and county-level annual income in the US over a 40 year period
and argue that even in a wealthy country like the US, “some economic vul-
nerabilities remain” and that “adapting to all climatic conditions along all
margins is too costly.” The US is particularly suitable for studying the effects
of temperature on social variables because data is readily available and the
land mass of the contiguous 48 states cover a range of climates and land cover
types (Olsson et al., 2014). Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) use a difference-in-
difference approach and find that an additional warm day (24-27 ◦C) reduces
the average US county’s per capita income by $14.78 and an additional hot
day (> 30 ◦C) reduces the average US county’s per capita income by $20.56.
The relationship between temperature and daily per capita income is non-
linear and Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) suggest that it is due to the effect
of temperature on reducing the productivity of workers and crops.
2.4 Adaptation to Climate
In IPCC (2014a), adaptation is defined as “the process of adjustment to ac-
tual or expected climate and its effects.” Adaptation depends on “adaptive
capacity”, which is determined by “socioeconomic characteristics.” (IPCC,
2001) A system’s vulnerability to external shocks is “a function of exposure,
sensitivity and adaptive capacity.” (Yohe and Tol, 2002) However, places
with the greatest adaptive capacity are not necessarily the places that face
the greatest exposure to climate change and vice versa. Furthermore, a coun-
try’s adaptive capacity may differ depending on the type of climate event:
11
for instance, it may be relatively adaptable to changes in mean temperature
but not very adaptable to increased frequency of tropical storms. Human so-
cieties have long had to develop various strategies for adapting to economic
shocks related to the climate, from the migration of pastoralists to modern
crop insurance schemes (Adger et al., 2003). In general, adaptation strate-
gies include reducing dependence on economic activities that are likely to be
heavily impacted by changes in climate (high-risk activities), such as shifting
away from drought-prone crops, reducing sensitivity to climate, such as not
building houses on floodplains, and fortifying existing infrastructure so as to
mitigate damages from extreme weather events, such as building levees along
the coast (Adger et al., 2003).
Adaptation to climate is complex because it involves the intertemporal val-
uation of the part of a country’s welfare that is dependent on the climate,
given vast uncertainty about the magnitudes of such changes, the interaction
between different types of changes and time frame at which these changes
are likely to take place (Stern et al., 2006). Furthermore, the actions that
can be taken by each country is limited by the number of possible adaptation
strategies. For instance, a country may have good public infrastructure but
face a high-risk of suffering damages from climate shocks because of the ge-
ographical layout of important natural resources (Adger et al., 2003). Adger
et al. (2003) list generic determinants of climate adaptive capacity as (1)
social capital (the ability of a society to undertake collective action (Adger,
2001)) (2) responsiveness of government institutions (in terms of flexibility,
innovation) (3) the ability of the private sector to take up opportunities that
arise due to changes in the climate and (4) the resilience of groups that are
at risk of climate-related damages.
Orlove (2005) describes episodes in the past where human societies adapted
or failed to adapt to changes in climate: the Mayan civilization (250 - 900
A.D.), North Atlantic and Baltic Viking settlements (985 - 1430 A.D.) and
the Dust Bowl era in the United States (mid. 20th century). All three soci-
eties had to develop novel ways of converting natural resources into economic
inputs: the Maya used water storage to supplement their agricultural water
supply and cut down forests to increase the amount of land available for agri-
culture; the Vikings had to adapt to new growing conditions in the places
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where they settled and supplemented their food supply with hunting game
and during the Dust Bowl, farmers had to experiment with new crops and
soil management techniques in order to accommodate drier growing condi-
tions. Orlove (2005) cautions that there are limits to how much a society can
adapt to changes in the climate, eventually both the Maya and the Vikings
faced increased mortality and eventual abandonment of their settlements,
partly due to insurmountable environmental challenges but also partly due
to policies that contributed or exacerbated existing resource strains.
2.5 Machine Learning
It is, however, a challenge to “collapse large quantities of large of high-
dimensional climate data into measures that efficiently summarize the dimen-
sions of climate that are influential on specific aspects of populations.” (Car-
leton and Hsiang, 2016) Dell et al. (2012) describe two approaches economists
have used to quantify the effects of climate on economies: (1) Researchers
have looked at the relationship between average temperature and aggregate
economic variables using cross-sectional data and (2) researchers have looked
at how different sectors of the economy respond to changes in climate and
aggregated these effects to produce a net effect on the economy as a whole.
These approaches face significant challenges. In the first instance, because
other countries are not good counterfactuals for what would happen in a
particular country in the absence of a change in average temperature, look-
ing at the correlation between average temperatures and aggregate economic
variables may produce “spurious associations of temperature with national
characteristics such as institutional quality.” In the second case, because of
the complexity of national economies and climate systems, “[the] set of can-
didate of mechanisms through which temperature may influence economic
outcomes is large and, even if each mechanism could be enumerated and
its operation understood, specifying how they interact and aggregate poses
substantial difficulties.” (Dell et al., 2012) In the opening lines of his pa-
per on the implications of increased frequency of extreme weather events
(“fat tails”), Martin Weitzman says that “[climate] change is so complicated,
and it involves so many sides of so many disciplines and viewpoints that
no analytically-tractable model or paper can aspire to illuminate more than
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one or two facets of the problem.” (Weitzman, 2011) Despite the challenges
of quantifying the mechanisms by which climate might affect the economy,
Hsiang and Burke (2014) suggest that “the absence of a single mechanistic
explanation for the observed association does not mean we lack evidence of
a causal association.”
In their paper, Temperature shocks and economic growth: Evidence from the
last half century, Dell et al. (2012) present us with an identification strategy
that takes changes in country-level yearly average temperature as an exoge-
nous shock and each country’s outcome in a different year as a counterfactual
for what would have happened in that country had the temperature shock not
occurred. Dell et al. (2012) estimate that a 1 ◦C increase in average annual
temperature reduces economic growth in a poor country by 1.3 percentage
points. Dell et al. (2012) also look at shifts in annual average temperature
between 1970 and 2000 and find that the coefficients are similar even though
there are larger standard errors. Burke et al. (2015) use data from Dell et al.
(2012) and fit a non-linear relationship between temperature and economic
growth. Looking at various projections Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 5
(O’Neill et al., 2015), a relatively “optimistic” projection of future climate
and socioeconomic outcomes given that fossil fuel reserves are abundant and
global economies are increasingly integrated, Burke et al. (2015) estimate
that increasing global average temperature will reduce global GDP by 23 %.
In contrast, Mendelsohn et al. (2006)’s estimates for climate damages are a
reduction of up to 23.8 % for the poorest quartile of countries, and smaller
reductions and some gains for higher income countries.
With regards to the economic growth literature, in 1997, Xavier Sala-́ı-Martin
ran two million regressions to determine which variables are “‘significantly’
correlated with growth.” Sala-́ı Martin (1997) looked at 62 variables which
were identified as relevant in the growth literature, selected 3 “robust” vari-
ables which he included in all regressions: national income, life expectancy
and primary school enrollment and ran different combinations of the remain-
ing 58 variables in sets of 3 to determine which variables are statistically
significant “almost all of the time” (more than 90 percent of the time) and
which variables are statistically significant 10 percent of the time or less.
However, Sala-́ı Martin (1997) notes that the variables that he identifies are
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variables that are linearly-related to economic growth. In the case of climate
change, there could be significant heterogeneity in “treatment effects,” and,
in the case of country-level aggregate data, “there may be many attributes
of a unit relative to the number of units observed and where the functional
form of the relationship between treatment effects and attributes of units
is not known.” (Athey and Imbens, 2016a) For instance, temperature may
have a linear relationship with some factors of the economy and a nonlinear
relationship with others.
To overcome difficulties in selecting relevant variables, fitting nonlinear mod-
els and dealing with large and complex datasets, Hal Varian suggests us-
ing machine learning techniques such as classification and regression trees,
random forests and penalized regressions (Varian, 2014). Susan Athey and
Guido Imbens (2016) outline a method for systematically dividing a dataset
into subpopulations which can be used to estimate heterogeneous treatment
effects. Each subpopulation is a “leaf” which forms part of a “tree”, a series
of optimized splits of the data. Researchers can set criteria for “pruning the
tree” which include boundaries for how closely the “tree” fits the data (a
minimum value for total Residual Sum of Squares) or a minimum “leaf size”
criteria (a minimum number of observations in each “leaf”) (Varian, 2014).
With increased processing power, researchers are able to run a large number
of regressions involving a large number of observations and variables and “in-
struct” the computer to use certain criteria to parse the data and fit the data
using linear or nonlinear models. In particular, with “supervised [machine]
learning”, researchers use a “training” dataset to generate a model that fits
the data and use the model to generate predictions for a new dataset. Re-
searchers can also “cross-validate” their model by using their model to make
predictions for data within the original dataset that was not used to generate
the model and seeing if their predictions are accurate based on existing data
(Athey and Imbens, 2016b).
For this thesis, we use a technique known as “recursive partitioning.” (Zeileis
et al., 2008) In conventional regression trees, the outcome variable is pre-
dicted based on some value of the partitioning variables (Varian, 2014) and
each terminal node is a collection of data points. In recursive partitioning,
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each terminal node is attached to a different parametric model (Zeileis et al.,
2008). In conventional regression trees, the same model is used for the whole
dataset, whereas in recursive partitioning, we are able to generate a different
temperature response function for each set of countries.
Finally, we include a set of comparisons between total GDP per capita growth
and agricultural GDP per capita growth because we recognize that agricul-
ture is a sector that is important for growth in developing countries and
agriculture is a sector that might be particularly sensitive to changes in
temperature. In 1961, Johnston and Mellor (1961) highlight the role of agri-
culture in economic growth: (1) Failing to meet demands for food will be
a serious impediment to growth (2) Expanding agricultural exports can be
an important source of income, especially for developing countries (3) Agri-
culture is a key source of surplus labor for other sectors (4) Agriculture is a
major sector in many countries and can be a source of capital for the devel-
opment of other sectors (5) Rising incomes of farmers and rural populations
can be a great boon for the economy. In more recent years, the World Bank
and other groups have continued to emphasize the importance of agriculture





Our data is taken from Burke et al. (2015). The main outcome of interest
is GDP per capita growth from the World Development Indicators dataset
(World Bank, 2017). Our main predictors are temperature and precipitation
aggregated at the year and country level from the University of Delaware’s
monthly gridded weather station data for air temperature and precipitation
(Willmott et al., 2001). It should be noted that not all countries have obser-
vations for the entire time period (1960 - 2010) because some countries only
came into existence after 1960 (e.g. former Soviet bloc countries) and GDP
data is not available for some countries during years when there was conflict
(e.g. Syria). We look at other variables that might determine countries’ tem-
perature response functions by importing time series data for (1) the share
of a country’s total GDP that is attributed to agriculture (Ag Share) (2)
the percent of a country’s population living in urban areas (Urbanization)
and (3) Gini coefficient (Inequality). We use these variables as well as GDP
(WDI) Percentile (Burke et al., 2015) (Income) and Share of GDP from the
Agricultural sector to partition the dataset using the classification test de-
scribed in Section 2.2. We use data from 2010 for all partitioning variables
because it is the last year that appears in the Burke et al. (2015) dataset.





Median Temperature 18.67 ◦C
Median GDP Per Capita (2010) $ 3,164
Median Ag Share (2010) 0.07
Median Inequality (2010) 33.76
Median Urbanization (2010) 0.87
Median Working Age Pop (2010) 0.64
Number of Countries 156
Number of Observations 6,584
3.2 Empirical Model
We use Burke et al. (2015)’s fixed effects model with quadratic terms for tem-
perature and precipitation, as well as country-specific linear and quadratic
time trends.
git = θi + θt + α1Tit + α2Tit
2 + β1Pit + β2Pit
2 + θi · t+ θi · t2 + εit
git are country-year observations for GDP per capita growth, θi are country
fixed effects, θt are year fixed effects, Tit and Pit are country-year observa-
tions for average temperature and precipitation, Tit
2 and Pit
2 are the squared
terms for average temperature and precipitation, θi · t is the country-specific
linear time trend and θi · t2 is the country-specific quadratic time trend. For
our paper, we separate the dataset into different subgroups and run Burke
et al. (2015)’s model on each subgroup separately.
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3.3 Model-Based Recursive Partitioning
The most common tool used in applied econometrics for summarizing rela-
tionships in the data is linear regression analysis (Varian, 2014). As men-
tioned in Chapter 2, the challenge we face in the climate - economy literature
is that relationships between climate variables and socioeconomic variables
can be complex and it is difficult to collapse high-dimensional datasets “into
measures that efficiently summarize the dimensions of climte that are in-
fluential on specific aspects of populations” (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016).
Fortunately, we are able to use machine learning to supplement our econo-
metric analyses and find x variables that provide us with a good prediction
of y (Varian, 2014). There are many methods available, but in this paper,
we will focus on regression trees and in particular, model-based recursive
partitioning (Zeileis et al., 2008).
In 1963, Morgan and Sonquist (1963) presented us with a “radical new
method for analyzing survey data” in the Journal of the American Statistical
Association:
The basic idea is the sequential identification and segregation of
subgroups one at a time, nonsymmetrically, so as to select the
set of subgroups which will reduce the error in predicting the
dependent variable as much as possible relative to the number
of groups. A subgroup may be defined as membership in one or
more subclasses of one or more characteristics.
After going through this process for the entire dataset, we end up with a
“tree” that shows us the variables which were used to split the dataset and
the resulting subgroups (Fig. 3.2). The benefit of this approach is that it
allows us to determine variables that are important to the analysis by detect-
ing underlying relationships in the data, instead of prematurely simplifying
our analysis by making “arbitrary or theoretical assumptions” (Morgan and
Sonquist, 1963). We can then prevent overfitting of the data by setting pa-
rameters for determining what kind of splits we will allow. For instance, in
our analysis, we find optimal splits by looking at the split (i.e. the value of
the partitioning variable) that minimizes the total RSS of the two subgroups
and we impose a ‘minimum node size criteria’ where subgroups must have at
19
least 10 countries. This prevents our analysis from being skewed by countries
that are very similar to each other that also have extreme values.
The most basic type of tree that we can generate is a classification tree.
In a classification tree, the terminal nodes are defined by constants which we
can use to predict the outcome variable. For example, Figure 1 in Varian
(2014) shows us a classification tree for the survivors of the Titanic. The
classification tree shows us that being older than 16 years of age and trav-
elling in first class meant that you were likely to be a survivor. A more
conventional approach to this problem in Economics would be to use a logit
or probit model (Varian, 2014).
Classification trees are useful for answering questions about prediction, but
if we wanted to answer questions about causal inference, we might want to fit
each terminal node using a function instead of a constant. With model-based
recursive partitioning (Zeileis et al., 2008), we generate a linear regression for
each node, but this approach can also be used with maximum likelihood mod-
els. We plot the models associated with the terminal nodes in Figures 4.2 -
4.5.
Let x be a variable which we will use to partition the data. Let c be a
value in x which we use as a threshold to partition the dataset. Sample is
an indicator variable which determines which set of observations to run the
regression over.
Sample =
0, if x > c1, if x ≤ c. ∀c
At fixed intervals of c, run the regression if Sample = 1 and run another
regression for Sample = 0 and calculate the residual sum of squares for each
regression. Repeat for all x and find the value of c that minimizes the total
residual sum of squares for both regressions. In Tables 3.2 - 3.4, we show the
RSS values obtained from finding splits using different partitioning variables.
We find that GDP Per Capita Percentile gives us the optimal first split for
the dataset. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that historical mean temperature is the
next optimal split for the low income and high income subgroups. We plot
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the total RSS values of using GDP Percentile (WDI) as the split variable for
the entire dataset in Figure 3.1. Minimum total RSS is 17.42 and the value
of GDP Percentile (WDI) that minimizes total RSS is 54.
In Figure 3.2, we show how the mean temperature split was obtained for
the high income countries. The red line indicates the point where total resid-
ual sum of squares is minimized. In Figure 3.3, we show how the minimum
node size constraint is applied for the mean temperature split for low income
countries. The value that minimizes total RSS for the low income countries
is 11 ◦C but this violates the minimum node size criteria and so we look for
the next point in the data where there is the next largest change in total
RSS, at 17 ◦C. In Figure 3.3, the original split value is indicated using the
dashed line and the value we obtain after accounting for minimum node size
is indicated using the red line. In Figure 3.4, we illustrate the splitting of the
dataset into groups using a regression tree. We perform the Chow test on
each split to test if the split is statistically significant. We find that all splits
are statistically significant when we perform the Chow test on the coefficients
for the linear and quadratic terms for temperature and precipitation, as well
as year fixed effects.
Figure 3.1
Total Residual Sum of Squares For GDP
Percentile (WDI) Values Used To Partition Dataset
Minimum RSS = 17.42, GDP Percentile = 54
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Figure 3.2
Total Residual Sum of Squares for Mean Temperature
Values Used to Partition High Income Countries
Figure 3.3
Total Residual Sum of Squares for Mean Temperature
Values Used to Partition Low Income Countries
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Table 3.2
Split Values for Partitioning Over Entire Dataset
Split Variable Split Value Total RSS
Mean Temp 12.00 18.79
Ag Share (2010) 0.32 19.04
Urbanization (2010) 0.54 19.12
Inequality (2010) 42.32 19.01
GDP Per Capita Percentile (WDI) 54.00 17.43
Table 3.3
Split Values for Partitioning Over the Low Income Countries
Split Variable Split Value Total RSS
Mean Temp 17.00 12.37
Ag Share (2010) 0.33 12.72
Urbanization (2010) 0.67 12.80
Inequality (2010) 32.12 12.77
GDP Per Capita Percentile (WDI) 8.00 12.51
Table 3.4
Split Values for Partitioning Over the High Income Countries
Split Variable Split Value Total RSS
Mean Temp 13.50 4.33
Ag Share (2010) 0.02 4.42
Urbanization (2010) 0.87 4.39
Inequality (2010) 41.02 4.36
GDP Per Capita Percentile (WDI) 57.00 4.39
Low income countries are defined as countries whose GDP per capita are in
the 53rd percentile and below. High income countries are defined as countries
who GDP per capita are in the 54th percentile and above. Mean Temp is each
country’s mean annual temperature from 1950 - 2010. Ag Share is defined
as the proportion of a country’s total GDP that is attributed to agriculture.
Urbanization is measured using the proportion of a country’s population
that lives in an urban area. Inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient
for each country. We take calculate Ag Share using data already present in
Burke et al. (2015)’s dataset and we obtain data for urbanization and inequal-
ity from the World Bank’s Work Development Indicators dataset. We take
our data for partitioning (with the exception of mean temperature) from the
year 2010, because that is the most recent year that is present in our dataset.
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Figure 3.4
Regression Tree of Nonlinear Fixed Effects Model of Annual Average
Temperature on GDP Per Capita Growth
In this figure, we show the criteria we used for splitting our sample of 156
countries into groups using a recursive partitioning algorithm (Zeileis et al.,
2008). In the figure, we have included the residual sum of squares value of
the split, which is the minimum RSS value compared to all the other possible
splits using the same variable. ’n’ refers to the number of countries in each
group. We obtained F-statistics for each split by performing the Chow test,
which tests for the statistical significance of splitting a dataset by testing the
equality of coefficients on both sides of the split.P values for the F-statistic
are included in parentheses.
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Table 3.5
Summary Statistics for Terminal Nodes
Income Split Low Income High Income
Median Temperature 24.12 ◦C 13.83 ◦C
Median GDP Percentile 77 77
Number of Countries 97 69
Number of Observations 3,806 2,778
Temp Split Low Income High Income
Low Temp High Temp Low Temp High Temp
Median Temperature 12.04 ◦C 25.09 ◦C 8.76 ◦C 20.81 ◦C
Median GDP Percentile 34 35 83 70
Number of Countries 20 77 36 33
Number of Observations 612 3,194 1,366 1,412
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Table 3.6
List of Countries in Terminal Nodes
Low Income Countries






Bosnia and Herzegovinia Botswana Mauritania
Belarus Burkina Faso Mauritius
Bhutan Cabo Verde Mozambique
China Cambodia Nepal
Georgia Cameroon Nicaragua




Morocco Democratic Republic of Congo Papua New Guinea
Moldova Cote d’Ivoire Paraguay
Mongolia Cuba Phillippines
Tajikistan Djibouti Rwanda
Turkmenistan Dominican Republic Samoa





















List of Countries in Terminal Nodes
High Income Countries



























Russian Federation South Africa
Serbia Spain
Slovak Republic Suriname
Slovenia Trinidad and Tobago









As seen in Figure 3.2, our data is split into 4 subgroups based on parti-
tioning variables for income (GDP Percentile, WDI) and mean temperature
(historical mean annual average temperature for each country). In Table 4.1,
we show the regression coefficients and standard errors of the temperature
and squared temperature variable when the data is split into these 4 sub-
groups. We find that the relationship between temperature and GDP per
capita growth is highly significant when we run the regression on the whole
sample, which lines up with the main findings of Burke et al. (2015). We
find that the relationship between temperature and growth is being driven by
high income countries, particularly countries which have low annual average
temperatures. This lines up with Burke et al. (2015) as well: With an “op-
timum” temperature of 13 ◦C, the low temperature, high income countries
are able to increase economic productivity as temperature increases and they
approach the peak of the hill-shaped relationship between temperature and
growth.(Fig. 3.1)
If the data does not correspond to an “adaptation” narrative, we expect that
higher annual temperatures will produce negative effects on high temperature
countries, regardless of income Burke et al. (2015), because they are on the
negatively-sloped side of the hill-shaped relationship between temperature
and growth. Without an “adaptation” narrative, we also expect low temper-
ature countries to benefit from higher annual temperatures as they approach
the “optimum” annual average temperature of 13 ◦C. If the data corresponds
to an “adaptation” narrative, we expect that higher annual temperatures will
have negative effects on low temperature countries, as they might have their
own “optimum” temperature that is lower than the “global optimum” and so
increasing temperatures may push them beyond their “local optimum” even
as their temperatures are still below the “global optimum.” With adaptation,
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we do not expect higher temperatures to be as damaging to high tempera-
ture countries because they might have a higher optimum temperature; in
other words, because they are already adapted to high temperatures. The
existing literature suggests that high income countries will be better able to
respond to higher temperatures because they are already able to capitalize
on the high temperatures they experience and they are, perhaps, less reliant
on more temperature-sensitive sector like agriculture (IPCC, 2014b; Mendel-
sohn et al., 2006). So, we expect high income - high temperature countries
to be less strongly affected by changes in temperature compared to the low
income - high temperature countries. Our results suggest that countries are
adapted to their historical temperatures and that we should take that into
account when we think about climate change and rising average tempera-
tures.
We seek to demonstrate that taking into account the heterogeneous responses
countries have towards temperature is a necessary step for evaluating present
and future impacts of climate change. First, we note that the temperature
and growth relationship produces different coefficients in each of the terminal
nodes and these coefficients differ from the ones we obtain when fitting the
whole sample with one function (Table 4.1). Next, in Figure 4.2 and 4.3,
we see that a homogeneous model for temperature and growth overestimates
GDP per capita growth for high income countries and slightly underesti-
mates GDP per capita growth for low income countries. We look at total
GDP per capita growth and agricultural GDP per capita growth to see if
agriculture might be a driving force in countries’ responses to temperature.
Finally, we generate projections for GDP per capita growth under different
climate scenarios: (1) a 1 ◦C increase in annual average temperature for all
countries (2) a 2 ◦C increase in annual average temperature for all countries
(3) country-specific temperature changes for the year 2100 under the Relative
Concentration Pathways (RCP) 8.5 climate scenario. The mean change in
average annual temperature under RCP 8.5 is 4.17 ◦C. The minimum change
is 2.68 ◦C (Cape Verde) and the maximum change is 5.78 ◦C (Finland).
When we look at the population-weighted average of global GDP per capita
projections, we see that all groups suffer lower economic growth as a result of
increased average temperatures. Our model allows us to look at how differ-
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ent groups of countries might be affected differently by projected changes in
temperature. In Table 4.3, we see that projected increases in annual average
temperature result in the largest damages for the low income - high tem-
perature countries and the high income - low temperature countries. This
is consistent with an interpretation where countries are adapted to the tem-
peratures they have experienced historically and a similar change in annual
average temperature can affect different countries differently.
For low income countries, those with high temperatures are likely to suf-
fer damages from increased temperatures while low temperature countries
are projected to benefit from increased temperatures. Low income - high
temperature countries see their economic growth decrease from 2.69 % under
the status-quo scenario to -3.19 % under year 2100 projections, whereas low
income - low temperature countries see their economic growth fall from 5 %
to 1.73 % in the year 2100.
For high income countries, our model predicts that high temperature coun-
tries will be able to maintain growth levels that are close to baseline and low
temperature countries suffer growth that is close to zero in the year 2100.
Under our calculation of the average GDP per capita growth for high income
- high temperature countries, we see growth increasing from 1.97 % at base-
line to 3.16 % in the year 2100 whereas for high income - low temperature
countries, growth falls from 1.87 % at baseline to 0.00879 % in the year 2100.
In Table 4.4 and 4.5, we compare predicted values for the subgroups us-
ing Burke et al. (2015)’s model (allowing the temperature response function
to be the same across countries) and our model (allowing the temperature
response function to be different for each subgroup). We see that the mod-
els produce similar results for baseline temperatures but diverge under other
climate scenarios. In the tables, we refer to Burke et al. (2015)’s model as
‘BHM’ and our model as ‘Het’. The divergence between BHM and Het mod-
els gets larger as the temperature changes become more severe. Tables 4.4
and 4.5 show that differing hypotheses of temperature response will lead to
different expectations about the future and, perhaps, different actions being
undertaken to mitigate or adapt to temperature changes. BHM overestimates
growth for low income - low temperature, low income - high temperature and
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high income - low temperature countries. BHM underestimates growth for
high income - high temperature countries.
In Figures 4.2 - 4.3, we plot predicted values given for BHM and Het models
given historically observed temperatures. For each node, we plot the median
of the mean temperatures in the group. In Figure 4.2, we see that BHM
predicts maximum growth at around the median temperature of the group.
However, we see that the Het model has a much flatter hill-shaped relation-
ship for the high income countries. In Figure 4.3, we see that BHM and
Het models both predict that low income countries have declining growth as
average annual temperatures increase, especially since most of the countries
in the group are on the negatively-sloped side of the curve.
In Figures 4.4 and 4.5, we plot predicted values for each terminal node for
historically observed annual temperatures and compare them with predicted
values under BHM. We see that the high temperature countries in both
groups tend to follow linear relationships between temperature and growth
whereas low temperature countries seem to have nonlinear relationships be-
tween temperature and growth. High income - high temperature countries
have a positive relationship with annual average temperatures whereas low
income - high temperature countries have a negative relationship with an-
nual average temperatures. In Figure 4.4, maximum growth for high income
- low temperature countries is at 9 ◦C whereas maximum growth predicted by
BHM is 14 ◦C and maximum growth predicted by our model for high income
countries is at 17 ◦C. In Figure 4.5, low income - low temperature coun-
tries have maximum growth at 13 ◦C whereas maximum growth predicted
by BHM is at 14 ◦C and maximum growth predicted by our model for low
income countries is at 16 ◦C. These results indicate that low temperature
countries have a lower optimal temperature for growth and high tempera-
ture countries have a higher optimal temperature for growth.
In Figure 4.6, plot total GDP per capita growth and agricultural GDP per
capita growth to see if the agricultural sector has a different response to tem-
perature compared to the economy as a whole. In Figure 4.6 we see that, as
a whole, agricultural GDP seems to have a steeper relationship with temper-
ature compared to the rest of the economy. In Tables 4.6 and 4.7, we see that
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agricultural GDP tends to have larger coefficients for the temperature and
squared temperature term. Subsgroups that have a statistically significant
relationship between temperature and total GDP per capita growth also had
statistically significant relationships between temperature and agricultural
GDP per capita growth. For the high income - high temperature countries,
however, the relationship between temperature and total GDP growth is not
significant whereas the relationship between temperature and agricultural
GDP is marginally significant (p = 0.077).
In Table 4.8 and 4.9, we compare predictions for agricultural GDP per capita
growth and total GDP per capita growth under different temperature change
scenarios. Looking at the BHM predictions, we see that while total GDP is
predicted to have positive growth under climate change scenarios, agricul-
tural GDP is predicted to have negative growth under climate change sce-
narios. The low temperature countries are projected to suffer more damages
in terms of agricultural GDP. If agriculture is adapted to certain ranges of
temperature, then veering beyond those physiological boundaries could be
detrimental to agricultural output. However, our data makes predictions
based on data from the past and does not account for colonization of land
that was previously permafrost by species that were hitherto unable to sur-
vive in low temperature countries.
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Figure 4.1
Predicted Values for GDP Per Capita Growth Using Whole Sample
(Burke et al., 2015)
The black dotted line indicates the annual average temperature of 13 ◦C,
which is found to be the most productive by Burke et al. (2015). The red
dotted line indicates the median temperature.
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Table 4.1
Fixed Effects Regression Results Using Splits
Determined By Classification Tests
Low Income Countries
Whole Sample Low Income Low Income
Low Temp High Temp
Temp 0.0210** 0.0114 0.0350 -0.0059
(0.0084) (0.0226) (0.0233) (0.0251)
Temp2 -0.0008*** -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0005)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Table 4.2
Fixed Effects Regression Results Using Splits
Determined By Classification Tests
High Income Countries
Whole Sample High Income High Income
Low Temp High Temp
Temp 0.0210** 0.0214** 0.0109*** 0.0029
(0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0023) (0.0181)
Temp2 -0.0008*** -0.0008** -0.0006*** -4.2E-6
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 4.3
Population-Weighted Average Global GDP Per Capita Growth
Without Splits Income Split Temp Split
(BHM, 2015)
1960 - 2010 Temperatures 3.44% 3.43% 3.43%
1 ◦C Increase 2.84% 2.82% 2.72%
2 ◦C Increase 2.16% 2.07% 1.80%
RCP 8.5 Year 2100 Projection 0.0317% 0.00227% -0.0482%
Table 4.4
Population-weighted Average GDP
Per Capita Growth For Terminal Nodes
Without Splits Low Income
(BHM,2015) Low Temp High Temp
1960 - 2010 Temperatures 3.44% 6.36% 2.69%
1 ◦C Increase 2.84% 5.89% 1.31%
2 ◦C Increase 2.16% 5.15% -0.112%
RCP 8.5 Year 2100 Projection 0.0317% 1.73% -3.19%
No. of countries 156 20 77
No. of Obs. 6,584 612 3,194
Without Splits High Income
(BHM,2015) Low Temp High Temp
1960 - 2010 Temperatures 3.44% 1.87% 1.97%
1 ◦C Increase 2.84% 2.26% 1.69%
2 ◦C Increase 2.16% 1.40% 2.55%
RCP 8.5 Year 2100 Projection 0.0317% 0.00879% 3.16%
No. of countries 156 36 33
No. of Obs. 6,584 1,366 1,492
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Table 4.5
Population-Weighted Average GDP Per Capita Growth
For Low Income Countries
Comparing Burke et al. (2015) and Heterogenous Model for Terminal Nodes
Low Income
Low Temp High Temp
BHM Het BHM Het
1960 - 2010 Temperatures 6.36 % 6.36 % 2.69 % 2.69 %
1 ◦C Increase 6.22 % 5.89 % 1.49 % 1.31 %
2 ◦C Increase 5.98 % 5.15 % 0.0194 % -0.112 %
RCP 8.5 Year 2100 Projection 4.83 % 1.73 % -2.79 % -3.19 %
No. of Countries 20 20 77 77
No. of Obs. 612 612 3,194 3,194
Table 4.6
Population-Weighted Average GDP Per Capita Growth
For High Income Countries
Comparing Burke et al. (2015) and Heterogenous Model for Terminal Nodes
High Income
Low Temp High Temp
BHM Het BHM Het
1960 - 2010 Temperatures 1.87 % 1.87 % 1.98 % 1.97 %
1 ◦C Increase 2.07 % 1.69 % 1.40 % 2.26 %
2 ◦C Increase 2.18 % 1.40 % 0.0743 % 2.55 %
RCP 8.5 Year 2100 Projection 2.02 % 0.00879 % -0.0988 % 3.16 %
No. of Countries 36 36 33 33
No. of Obs. 1,366 1,366 1,492 1,492
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Figure 4.2
Predicted GDP Per Capita Growth for High Income Countries
Figure 4.3
Predicted GDP Per Capita Growth for Low Income Countries
The black line indicates predicted values for high income countries under
our model and the dotted line indicates predicted values for all countries
under BHM. Red vertical lines indicate temperatures at which maximum
growth occurs under our model and BHM. Shaded areas indicate the 95 %
confidence interval for predicted GDP per capita growth values. For high
income countries, maximum growth occurs at 17 ◦C under our model and
for low income countries, maximum growth occurs at 16 ◦C. Under BHM,
maximum growth occurs at 13 ◦C.
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Figure 4.4
Predicted GDP Per Capita Growth for High Income Countries
With Mean Temp Split
Figure 4.5
Predicted GDP Per Capita Growth for Low Income Countries
with Mean Temp Split
The black line indicates predicted values for the high income or low income
countries under BHM. The blue line indicates predicted values for low tem-
perature countries and the red line indicates predicted values for high tem-
perature countries. Shaded areas indicate the 95 % confidence interval for
predicted GDP per capita growth values. Red vertical lines indicate tem-
peratures at which maximum growth occurs under our model and BHM.
Predicted values for growth are linear and positive for high income - high
temperature countries and linear and negative for low income - high tem-
perature countries. Maximum growth occurs at 9 ◦C for high income - low
temperature countries and 13 ◦C for low income - low temperature countries.
Under BHM, maximum growth occurs at 13 ◦C.
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Figure 4.6
Predicted Values for GDP Per Capita Growth
and Agricultural GDP Per Capita Growth Using the Whole Sample
The black line represents total GDP per capita growth while the blue line
represents agricultural GDP per capita growth. The shaded area represents
the 95 % confidence interval for predicted values of agricultural GDP per
capita growth. The dotted line represents the median temperature of the
whole sample. Maximum growth for both total and agricultural GDP per
capita occurs at 13 ◦C.
39
Table 4.7
Fixed Effect Regression Results Using Total GDP Per Capita Growth and
Agricultural GDP Per Capita Growth For Low Income Countries
No Splits (BHM, 2015) Low Inc - Low Temp
GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP
Temp 0.0127*** 0.0224** 0.0348 0.0285
(0.003) (0.009) (0.023) (0.032)
Temp2 -4.87E-04*** -8.56E-04*** -1.36E-03 -1.75E-03
(1.18E-04) (2.62E-04) (0.001) (0.001)
Precip 1.44E-05* 8.46E-05*** -1.48E-05 2.08E-04
(1.01E-05) (2.69E-05) (3.71E-05) (1.61E-04)
Precip2 -4.73E-09 -1.94E-08*** -3.22E-09 -3.46E-08
(2.56E-09) (6.81E-09) (5.07E-09) (2.81E-08)
No. of countries 156 156 20 20
No. of obs. 6,584 6,584 612 612
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
No Splits (BHM, 2015) Low Inc - High Temp
GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP
Temp 0.0127*** 0.0224** -0.00316 -0.0383
(0.003) (0.009) (0.026) (0.061)
Temp2 -4.87E-04*** -8.56E-04*** -2.10E-04 3.12E-04
(1.18E-04) (2.62E-04) (5.60E-04) (0.00124)
Precip 1.44E-05* 8.46E-05*** 3.16E-05** 0.000130***
(1.01E-05) (2.69E-05) (1.44E-05) (0.0000287)
Precip2 -4.73E-09 -1.94E-08*** -9.55E-09*** -3.23E-08***
(2.56E-09) (6.81E-09) (3.46E-09) (7.78E-09)
No. of countries 156 156 77 77
No. of obs. 6,584 6,584 3,194 3,194
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 4.8
Fixed Effect Regression Results Using Total GDP Per Capita Growth and
Agricultural GDP Per Capita Growth For High Income Countries
No Splits (BHM,2015) High Inc - Low Temp
GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP
Temp 0.0127*** 0.0224** 0.0112*** 0.0378***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011)
Temp2 -4.87E-04*** -8.56E-04*** -5.91E-04*** -2.22E-03***
(1.18E-04) (2.62E-04) (1.57E04) (5.48E-04)
Precip 1.44E-05* 8.46E-05*** 5.49E-05*** 8.77E-05
(1.01E-05) (2.69E-05) (4.02E-05) (1.36E-04)
Precip2 -4.73E-09 -1.94E-08*** -3.90E-08* -4.99E-08
(2.56E-09) (6.81E-09) (2.30E-08) (7.61E-08)
No. of countries 156 156 36 36
No. of obs. 6,584 6,584 1,366 1,366
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
No Splits (BHM,2015) High Inc - High Temp
GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP
Temp 0.0127*** 0.0224** 0.00337 -0.0742*
(0.003) (0.009) (0.018) (0.040)
Temp2 -4.87E-04*** -8.56E-04*** -1.24E-05 1.53E-04
(1.18E-04) (2.62E-04) (4.80E-04) 1.09E-03)
Precip 1.44E-05* 8.46E-05*** 1.39E-05 1.52E-05
(1.01E-05) (2.69E-05) (2.17E-05) 5.13E-05
Precip2 -4.73E-09 -1.94E-08*** -2.53E-09 -3.23E-09
(2.56E-09) (6.81E-09) (4.36E-09) (9.04E-09)
No. of countries 156 156 33 33
No. of obs. 6,584 6,584 1,412 1,412
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 4.9
Population-Weighted Projected Values for Total GDP Per Capita Growth
and Agricultural GDP Per Capita Growth For Low Income Countries
No Splits Low Income
(BHM, 2015) Low Temp High Temp
GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP
1960 - 2010 Temperatures 3.44% -6.14% 6.36% 2.49% 2.69% 4.66%
1 ◦C Increase 2.84% -7.19% 5.89% 0.24% 1.31% 2.41%
2 ◦C Increase 2.16% -8.41% 5.15% -2.35% -0.11% 0.23%
RCP 8.5 Year 2100 0.32% -11.68% 1.73% -11.23% -3.19% -4.12%
No. of countries 156 156 20 20 77 77
No. of obs. 6,584 6,584 612 612 3,194 3,194
Table 4.10
Population-Weighted Projected Values for Total GDP Per Capita Growth
and Agricultural GDP Per Capita Growth For High Income Countries
No Splits High Income
(BHM, 2015) Low Temp High Temp
GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP GDP Ag GDP
1960 - 2010 Temperatures 3.44% -6.14% 1.87% 2.71% 1.97% 13.05%
1 deg. C increase 2.84% -7.19% 1.69% 1.64% 2.26% 11.41%
2 deg. C increase 2.16% -8.41% 1.40% 0.12% 2.55% 10.07%
RCP 8.5 Year 2100 0.32% -11.68% 0.09% -5.90% 3.16% 8.15%
No. of countries 156 156 36 36 33 33




The main contribution of our paper to the climate-economy literature is that
we use a data-driven approach to fit multiple functions in the same dataset
and in so doing, we are able to formally corroborate many ideas that are
often discussed in the literature but less often demonstrated. Our results
support that of Dell et al. (2012) and Mendelsohn et al. (2006), which find
that higher temperatures lead to reduced growth in low income countries.
With Burke et al. (2015) and Dell et al. (2012), we note that our data only
accounts for the effect that temperature has on GDP per capita growth and
not other effects on society that may come about due to increased annual
average temperatures e.g. rising sea levels, increased frequency of extreme
weather events, etc. Our results also do not account for important within -
country heterogeneities which play an important role in the average person’s
experience of changes in climate, especially for larger countries that encom-
pass multiple climate and agroecological zones. It may be that hotter regions
within a country will react to temperature changes differently than colder re-
gions within a country (Deryugina and Hsiang, 2014). We also recognize that
we have adopted a largely empirical approach and have made the assumption
that including country fixed effects and country-specific linear and quadratic
time trends accounts for other factors such as education or technology. A
worthy avenue of further research would be developing theoretical economic
models that account for the impact of climate on society. Furthermore, we
also note that our projections were made based on countries’ historical re-
sponses to changes in the annual average temperature. There should be a de-
gree of caution when extrapolating beyond the temperature ranges countries
have experienced. However, rising temperatures are likely to be a reality for
many countries and so we add our work to the rest of the literature that aims
to aid in efforts to prepare for the effects of anticipated temperature changes.
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We find that low income - high temperature and highly agricultural coun-
tries are at risk of negative GDP per capita growth as a result of projected
temperature changes (Table 4.4). Dube et al. (2016) relates the impact of
climate change on local livelihoods in different African countries to regional
and continental impacts and finds that because a large proportion of people
in African countries are engaged in agricultural activities, the effect of a bad
harvest or a drought is much more strongly felt. The effects become stronger
if the country is a low income country that may not have the infrastructure
necessary to adapt to or mitigate the deleterious effects of changing tem-
peratures (IPCC, 2014b). Our findings support the many calls for increased
efforts to help vulnerable groups begin adapting to the climatic changes that
are already beginning to materialize.
In Table 4.4 and 4.5, we look at the differences in projected average GDP per
capita growth for terminal nodes according to the model used by Burke et al.
(2015) and our model. We note that the models produce similar projections
for baseline temperatures and differ greatly when it comes to projected im-
pacts of temperature in the year 2100. Burke et al. (2015) predict that low
income - low temperature countries will retain high levels of growth (4.83 %)
whereas our model predicts that low income - low temperature countries will
have low growth in 2100 (1.73 %). Both models predict negative growth for
the low income - high temperature countries in the year 2100.
For high income - low temperature countries, Burke et al. (2015)’s model
predicts that growth will not change much from baseline levels (2.02 %)
whereas our model predicts reduced growth (0.00879 %). For high income
- high temperature countries, Burke et al. (2015)’s model predicts negative
growth (-0.0988 %) whereas our model predicts positive growth (3.16 %).
The implication of our results is that we are to expend our resources to help
countries mitigate the damages from climate change, accounting for adapta-
tion will be an important consideration for which countries these efforts are
directed to. If we do not consider adaptation and only look at the general
effects of temperature on countries, we will want to direct our investments
to high temperature countries. If we consider adaptation to historical mean
temperatures, we will want to direct our investments to low income countries
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but high income - low temperature countries should also make mitigation a
priority. High income - high temperatures are not projected to suffer dam-
ages under our model, but we should note that the RCP 8.5 scenario assumes
“modest technological growth” and reliance on coal and increased scarcity of
oil and gas (Riahi et al., 2011).
We find that under BHM, agricultural GDP will suffer up to 11.68 % de-
cline in the year 2100 overall. In our analysis, the low income countries and
the high income - low temperature countries will experience negative growth
whereas high income - high temperature countries will experience high growth
in agriculture. Our projections show that the bulk of the damages are borne
by the low income - low temperature countries (-11.23 %), followed by the
high income - low temperature countries (-5.90 %) and the low income - high
temperature countries (-4.12 %). As to how likely these changes are to occur,
the discussion hinges on whether or not plant species will be able to adapt
to new conditions or “move northward” as lands that were formerly too cold
for cultivation become warmer. Pecl et al. (2017) consider the impacts of the
migration of biodiversity under climate change. They note that terrestrial
species have been moving towards colder regions at a rate of 17 kilometers
per decade and marine species 72 kilometers per decade. However, even as
some flora and fauna are able to migrate to more suitable habitats, humans,
who rely on technology to overcome environmental constraints might not be
able to move as easily to places where they might be able to take advantage
of better agricultural prospects. Furthermore, there is a web of complex in-
teractions between changing temperature, food supply (e.g. coffee, Atlantic
salmon) and economic growth that is beyond the scope of this paper.
One feature of the time period we study that is unique is the dissolution
of the Soviet Union that occurred in the 1990s. After 1991, there were a
number of new countries that were formed that are in the same geograph-
ical region and were subject to similar economic policies for a number of
decades. The central Asian countries experienced similar patterns in the
1990s – “skyrocketing inflation, partial de-industrialization and the collapse
of Soviet-style welfare systems” (Batsaikhan et al., 2017). 15 of the countries
in our dataset are former Soviet Union countries (including Russia) and 9
out of the 15 belong to the low income group of countries and all of them are
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low temperature countries. In this paper, we have chosen to keep the former
Soviet countries in our analysis but we should treat the projections for low
income - low temperature countries as a lower bound for climate damages
because of the effect the former Soviet countries might have had on our pre-
dictions.
Finally, Mahapatra and Ratha (2017) argue that the Paris Climate Accord
still has “miles to go” in moving countries to a low-carbon pathway because
of the “absence of actionable commitments, discord on sharing of remain-
ing carbon space, disagreement over finance, lack of clarity and sidelining
the least developed and vulnerable countries.” Our results suggest that high
income countries should not be complacent about the projected effects of
climate change and investments in mitigation will be beneficial to both high
income and low income countries.
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